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Every schoolboy used to know about the problem with the Holy Roman Empire:
it was neither “Holy”, nor “Roman” nor even an “Empire”. Similar limitations may
inhibit our wholehearted acceptance of the “Second Demographic Transition” con-
cept in demography. In some important respects, this concept is not so much “sec-
ond”but“secondary”,isnotreally“demographic”andcannotproperlybedescribed
as a “transition” at all. Furthermore, while excellent in parts, the concept may be
criticisedasbeinginsomewaysstatisticallyincoherent,torestonanunderlyingthe-
orythatisbynomeansfreeofdefects,andalsotobeover-stretchedunreasonably to
cover some phenomena better accounted for by other viewpoints.
Thatapart,theseconddemographictransitionmustberecognisedasanexcellent
description,andpartialanalysis,ofnewlifestylepreferenceswhichhavebecomeun-
doubtedly verysalientinmanymodernsocietiesoverthelastthreedecadesormore.
Ifthetheoryiscorrect,theymaybecomeasuniversalasanythingcanbe.SecondDe-
mographicTransitiontheoryisunusuallyscientificallyvaluable–andthereforevul-
nerable–becauseitconnectsthedescriptionofempiricalphenomenawithanunder-
lyingtheoryinascientificallytestablemanner.Inthisrespectitissuperiortomostin-
terpretations of the “first” demographic transition theory. It is always easier merely
tocriticisethantobecreative,andwhileattemptingtodrawattentiontosomelimita-
tions in the concept it is necessary first to pay homage to it and to its twin begetters,
whose double fathership perhaps symbolises the new forms of family structure
which their theory celebrates.
So let it be clear that the concept of the “Second demographic transition” is un-
doubtedlythetheoryofthedecade,biddingfairtodominatedemographicthinkingat
the beginning of the new century as the “first” demographic transition dominated
that of the last. A theory that has launched a thousand research projects, it has been
described as “the” mainstream concept among population scholars dealing with de-
mographic change in European societies” (EAPS 2002 p. 3). Developed jointly by
van de Kaa (1987) and Lesthaeghe (1987) as recently as 1986, it is an ambitious
model.Firstitdescribes,andrecognisesasa“package”,orsyndrome,thesubstantial
and unprecedented progress of cohabitation, lone parenthood, childbearing outside
marriageand lowfertility observedin manycountries sincethe1960s and theparal-
lel retreat in those societies from marriage and from traditional norms of sexual re-
straint. All these demographic trends have been consolidated during the 1990s (see
Kiernan 2002, Heuveline et al. 2003) and as the theory predicts, are increasing
almost everywhere in the developed world, although still at different levels of
prevalence.
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versity of forms of sexual partnership, and the relaxation of traditional norms and
constraints observed in many developed societies since the 1960s, areintimately re-
latedandsharecommoncauses.Theyareheldtobeirreversibleandlikelytobecome
universal.Thenewtransitionismadepossiblebyparalleltrendsinfurthereconomic
growth, intellectual emancipation through education and the concomitant ease of
diffusion ofideas,especiallyreflectedinthestatusofwomen.Itsunderlying theory,
derived from the work of Maslow (1954) and Inglehart (1990), posits an emancipa-
tion from traditional deferential modes of behaviour once material needs and anxi-
eties are mostly satisfied though the achievement of prosperity and, in Europe at
least, the personal security offered by the welfare states which that prosperity
sustains, with concomitant freedom for self-realisation and tolerance of that of
others.
Numerous empirical studies in Western countries support the theory. At national
level there is indeed a syndrome of “Second Demographic Transition” behaviour.
Populations with a high prevalence of (for example) divorce also tend to have lower
levelsofmarriage,higher prevalenceofcohabitation andofbirths outside marriage,
andabortionratios,althoughthestatisticalassociationisnotalwaysverystrong.The
prevalence or even the possibility of such behaviour is of course modulated by na-
tionalgovernmentpoliciesonfamilywelfareandonlegalprovisionsfordivorceand
abortion,whicharefarfromuniform(Tomka 2003). EVS,FFS,Eurobarometerand
other surveys show that those populations, and individuals, who score higher on
“post-materialist” responses are more likely to be engaged in unconventional living
arrangements such as cohabitation (Lesthaeghe and Moors 1996) and to “do their
own thing” in many other ways. Not surprisingly, therefore, the trend towards “post
material” values and attitudes is presented by the votaries of the “second demo-
graphictransition”asanhistoricallyinevitableuniversaldevelopmentofirresistible
force.
However,thepurposeofthisdebatecontributionisnottopraisetheseconddemo-
graphictransition,noreventoburyit,butmodestlytodirectattentiontosomepossi-
ble limitations.
Not “Second” but “Secondary”—only a partial regime change
TheSDTconceptcertainlydocumentsamajordevelopmentinbehaviour.Indica-
tors relating to sexual behaviour and living arrangements have been elevated to sta-
tistically unprecedented levels in European society, touching most of the people of
thedevelopedworldtoagreaterorlesserdegree:inthewordsofthesong–“inSpain,
thebestuppersetsdoit;evenLithuaniansandLettsdoit…”Somethingiscertainly
happening.However,asCliquet(1991)pointedoutinaseminalcritique,lotsofother
things have also happened to population, arguably of greater moment. The Upper
Palaeolithic cultural revolution gave human population a much more assured mas-
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Neolithicrevolution multiplied the5millionorsoinhabitants oftheEarthattheend
ofthePalaeolithicovertenfold. Itisassumed,though undocumented, thatEuropean
populationsinearliercenturiesenjoyedincommonwiththerestofhumanityamuch
moreuniversalandearlypatternofmarriagethanthatrevealedwhentheparishregis-
tersliftthecurtainonmarriageinthe16
thcenturytoshowusthe“WesternEuropean
Marriage Pattern” already showing to full houses. If the new living arrangements
comprise a “transition” then it is the fourth or fifth, not the “second.
Insomerespectsthenewtrendsinbehaviourrepresentacontinuationofthe“First
DemographicTransition”orofitsunderlyingforces,whichithasfollowedcloselyin
time, as indeed its progenitors state. The same kinds of cultural and ideational
change that areheld to propel theSDTarealsoadduced to account for theinitial ad-
vent of family planning and low fertility norms in an increasingly literate society in
the 19
th century, and the parallel or earlier advance of more rational and scientific
thinking about health and disease. Individualisation has been a continuous process;
themuch-citedcontrastbetweenthereignofthe“king-child”andthelaterdomainof
the“king-pairwithachild”appearstolacksubstanceineithersociologyorinlitera-
ture.AfewpartsofEurope,ofcourse,pre-emptedtheSDTwithoutinstructionfrom
demographicjournals,forexampleintherelativelyhighlevelsoftraditionalcohabi-
tation and extramarital births in Iceland, rural Sweden and Hungary in earlier
centuries.
AndEuropeisnostrangertomaritalbreakdown.Itwasonlyinthe1980sthatthe
risk of breakdown of marriage in Britain, for example, finally exceeded the equiva-
lent risk among the marriage cohorts of the late 18
th century. Faced with unprece-
dented and possibly unendurable durations of marriage, a tendency divorce might
simplyberegardedasarestorationofthestatusquo;afunctionalsubstitutefordeath.
Outside Europe it isnot so easyto seehowthe SDT concept canbe grafted on to de-
mographicregimesthatalreadyincorporatesomeofitssalientfeatures.Divorceand
easyre-marriage(formen)istraditionalinsomepolygamousAfricansocieties,gen-
erally and traditionally in Islam and in traditional Japan, while cohabitation and ex-
tramarital birth were institutionalised in Latin American and the Caribbean, and to
some extent among US blacks, for a century or more before the “first” demographic
transition arose. But nowhere, it must be conceded, has the whole package been ap-
parent before the late 20
th century.
Not really “Demographic”
ThenextobjectionisthattheSecondDemographicTransitionisnottruly“demo-
graphic” in that it does not address the central issues of demography. It may be im-
possible to resolve what constitutes “demography”, but perhaps it could be agreed
that its central concerns are with the biological phenomena of birth and death, the
factors that determine their pattern and trend and thereby the structure, growth and
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the central theme of the “first” demographic transition which revolutionised all as-
pectsofdemographicregimesatthemicroandthemacroscalewiththeexception,in
Europe, of marriage and household.
The second demographic transition concept, on the other hand, is more con-
cerned with marriage and its alternatives; with sex, morals and living arrangements.
While marriage is, of course, a proximate determinant of fertility, the contraceptive
revolution that began in the later 19
th century had at least partly uncoupled marriage
frombirthrates,thusreducingtherelevancetocentralpopulationphenomenaofone
of the most important subjects of “second demographic transition” behaviour. Sex-
ual arrangements are just as much the business of sociologists as of demographers
andrelativelyirrelevanttotrendsinbirthrates.Theconcepthasnothingtosayabout
mortality or population growth, decline or ageing, unlike the “first” transition. Nei-
therdoestheSDTconcepthaveanyconnectionwithinternalorinternationalmigra-
tion. The processes it describes are important and interesting enough without the
needtoelevatetheseverypartialregimechangesintoa“transition”ofthesamerank
as the “first”.
Not a “Transition”?
A“transition”shouldbecompleteandirreversible,asthe“first”oneisheldtobe,
notatransientcyclicalchangebutapermanentmovement,sharedbymostindividu-
als in a population, between one long term sustainable demographic pattern and
another.
But even in the “progressive” populations most enthusiastic for the Second De-
mographicTransitiontherelevantbehaviourremainshighlyheterogeneous.Onlyin
very few countries are more than half of all births outside marriage. Pre-marital co-
habitation mayindeedbenearlyuniversalinScandinavianpopulations butnonehas
yetabandonedmarriage.Inmostmodernsocieties,mostmarriagesarestillendedby
the death of one of the partners rather than by divorce. By contrast, the first demo-
graphictransitioniscomplete:inthedevelopedworldfamilysizeistightlyclustered
around anaverageofsomewhatunder twochildren, 90%ofbirths survivetoage60,
and barring migration the end of population growth has arrived.
SDTbehaviourisgenerallyincreasingeveninthosepopulationsthathaveproved
mostresistantto change, in Southern Europe and Asia.But so farit remainsasome-
what regionally limited phenomenon, still concentrated in its more developed form
northoftheAlps,thoughwidespreadintheEnglish-speakingworldoverseas.Those
Asianpopulations whichhavereducedvitalratesinsospectacularamannerhaveso
far shunned cohabitation and births outside marriage, even though early marriage
maybeinfullretreatandsomeurbanfemalepopulationsareshowingunprecedented
tendencies to remain unmarried in Tokyo, Bangkok, Singapore and elsewhere. In
some of those societies, high divorce rates were traditional. Advocates of the SDT
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births outside marriage, in somewhat Hegelian fashion, as evidence of populations
inexorably proceeding to a common destination, only at different speeds. They may
be right, but this “transition” may stall half-complete, much as did an earlier Refor-
mationwhichhasmadelittleprogressbeyond theAlps,orevenbeyond alinefamil-
iar since the Treaty of Wesphalia in 1648. Even at the 1987 census the religious
compostion of the two treaty towns remain distinct; with Protestants and Catholics
aboutequallynumerousinOsnabrückinNiedersachsen,whilejustacrosstheborder
in Münster (Nordrhein-Westfalen) Catholics outnumber Protestant by about 3:1
(data from Henkel 2001 and pers comm.).
Some important populations in the Western world have remained notably resis-
tanttoit,particularlyAsianimmigrantsandmostofallMuslims.Arrangedmarriage
with spouses from the countries of origin is prevalent in many of those immigrant
populations. This is, in part, because even co-religionists who have been brought up
in the “enlightened” and emancipated West are not considered to be suitable mar-
riage partners lest they have imbibed some of the values under discussion here. In
fact the younger generation of Muslims in Europe is showing signs of reverting to a
more traditional Islam, demonstrated publicly through the wearing of headscarves
and other outward signs of inward solidarity. That is not the way of the “Second
Demographic Transition”.
Furthermore, for whatever reasons, by the end of the 1990s the secular trend in
second demographic transition behaviour was faltering, or even declining in a few
populations.Thereisnoreasonwhydivorceshouldnotreach100%ofallmarriages,
orthetotaldivorcerateexceedone.Butthetrendisnotpointinginthatdirection.The
end of the rapid acceleration of divorce in some countries (Figure 1) may be simply
anunsurprisingconsequenceofthesmallerandmoreselectivepartofthepopulation
that has marriedin recentdecades;alife table analysis isreally needed. And the end
of trend in the Balkan and former Soviet examples in the (very selected) group may
be down to a calming down of post-communist turmoil, but its faltering in France,
Denmark and Norway may be more interesting. We also have to account for the ap-
parentincreaseinthepopularityofmarriageinsomecountries,wheretotalfirstmar-
riage rates have been going up (Figure 2). This may be a recuperation effect, how-
ever. Application of the Bongaarts-Feeney methods to total first marriage rates
showsthatdelayinmarriageaccountsforthegreaterpartoftheapparentreductionin
propensity tomarry,forexampleinCEEcountries inthemiddle1990s. InBulgaria,
HungaryandtheCzechandSlovakRepublics,adjustmentincreasestheTFMRfrom
about 0.6 to about 0.8, although the final value for Bulgaria remains at a low level
(Philipov 2003, pp. 108–109).
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Trends in total divorce rate
Figure 2
Sustainable?
To be permanent, or at least long-term, transitions must, presumably, be sustain-
able.Theunderlying theoryoftheSDTpositsradicalideationalchangemadepossi-
ble by economic progress. Are the ideational preferences for self-realisation, once
16 Why we don’t have to believe without doubtingattained, irreversible irrespective of the standards of material security which made
their realisation possible in the first place? And does their realisation have any feed-
backonit?Wealthemancipatespopulationsfromanxietiesaboutmaterialneedsand,
in Europe, supports the welfare states and social housing policies on which choices
oflivingarrangementsatleastpartlydepend.Butsomeofthosewelfareprogrammes
have already been checked or reversed in Western societies from Sweden to New
Zealand,asbudgetdeficitshaverisenandelectorates,atleastforawhile,roseagainst
a regime of such high taxation. In some welfare regimes, high levels of divorce and
loneparenthoodmaysimplytransfersomeofthecostsoftheconsumptionofwomen
andtheproduction ofchildrentothegeneraltaxpayer.Thatmaynotbeaffordablein
thelongrun. IntheUKforexample,estimatesofthecostoffamilybreakdownhave
ranged from £4 billion p.a. to £10 billion p. a.. A more recent analysis by a pressure
group, the Family Matters Institute (2000), estimated the direct costs to be £15 bil-
lion p.a., equivalent to about a third of public spending on education In that country
divorce creates three households for every two that existed before, and relationship
breakdown is the biggest route out of owner-occupation into state subsidised “so-
cial”housing (Holmansetal.1987). Itmaybethatthehighcostsofloneparenthood
are a particularly grim consequence of an especially pathological Anglo-Saxon
pattern of living arrangements, with their high proportion of teenage births to girls
without partners, married or unmarried.
Furthermore, lone parenthood tends to inflict psychosocial as well as material
handicaps upon children brought up in fragmented or unconventional households,
compared with those from intact families—specifically in respect of school perfor-
mance, discipline and subsequent parenting (Kiernan 1992, Ermisch and
Francesconi2001aandb,Osborneetal.2003).This,however,mayagainbeaspecial
feature peculiar to the circumstances of the UK and the US, where a higher propor-
tion of children born outside marriage are brought up with only one parent than in
Europe. More generally it may be asked whether modern economies can afford the
long-term costs of the second demographic transition at the same time as the un-
avoidableandpermanentdragoneconomicgrowthpresentedbypopulationageing.
A problem of coherence? The second demographic transition
and low fertility.
From its inception, the Second Demographic Transition concept was held to be
intimatelyconnectedwiththeestablishmentoflowfertilityandinparticular“lowest
-low” fertility; that is with a TFR below1.5 or below 1.3, according to taste. Therein
laymuchofthestrictlydemographicinterestoftheconcept.Therearetwoproblems
here.Thefirstisthatbelow-replacementfertilityisnotanewphenomenon,although
the ultra-low levels of TFR in Southern and Eastern Europe are without precedent.
Below-replacement fertility was first achieved in Western Europe in the 1930s and
notjustasaresultoftheeconomicdepression—prosperousregionsthenhadthelow-
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France, Sweden, and New Zealand were the same as in 2000 or lower. US TFR in
1933 was identical to that in 2000 (2.14). The problem is, perhaps, that too many
analysesstartinthe1960swhendataseriesfromEurostatandtheCouncilofEurope
so conveniently come on stream.The 1960s was the high point of the baby boom. A
graph truncated at that period gives a false impression of an inexorable downward
slidecoincidingwiththeonsetoftheSDT,whileinfactinmostcountriestherealde-
cline was forty years earlier. The 1950s and the 1960s are a deceptive aberration in
fertility history.
Secondly, the second demographic transition manifestly has nothing to do with
lowfertilityonacross-nationalbasistoday. Fromatheoreticalviewpoint,ofcourse,
few things could be more bound up with traditional concepts of duty and behaviour,
or attended with more cost and inconvenience, than bearing and caring for children.
It would be reasonable, indeed logically necessary given the underlying theory, for
populationsthatscorehighestonpost-materialideationalresponsesandwhichman-
ifest strongly the other SDT attributes, to have the lowest fertility as well; wisely
avoidingopportunity costsof£250,000 andabout20yearsofpartialhousearrest,so
as to express their own individualities in greater freedom.
That is strikingly not the case. Neither the empirical nor the theoretical expecta-
tion is realised; quite the reverse. Comparing national populations, the relationship
between the patterns and trends of period fertility levelsand other “SDT”behaviour
are exactly the reverse of what might have been expected (Figure 3). Populations
most enthusiastic for non-traditional living arrangements within the developed
world (NW Europe and English-speaking countries overseas)tend to have the high-
est fertility, where the lowest might be expected. Populations with very low fertility
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Figure 3aretypicallythosewheretraditionalattitudestowardssexualrelationshipsandliving
arrangements still persist. Thus all the countries of Southern Europe with the partial
exception of Portugal, together with Germany, Japan, Korea, Singapore and other
developed countries outside Europe, have low or lowest- low levels of divorce, co-
habitation andillegitimacywhileatthesametimetheyhavethelowestfertilityrates
intheworld:(BettioandVilla1996).AnditisnoteasytoseehowSDTtheorycanac-
count for the rise in the birth rate in a number of Western countries—notably
France—or for Sweden’s roller-coaster birth rate.
Problematic underlying theory
TheSDTconceptisadmirablyintellectuallycomprehensiveinpresentingatheo-
retical structure to account for the set of variables that it describes. But the Inglehart
conceptof“post-materialism”ideologyunderlyingSDTtheoryisitselfaweaktheo-
retical foundation, despite is wide popularity in social science. Its critics find little
difference between “materialism/post-materialism” and the conservative/liberal
polesofpersonality (DegraafandEvans1996, Marshall1997). Themostfrequently
used short form of the questionnaire only poses four questions and has a weak
test-retest consistency (the longer version does better: Heath, Evans and Martin
1994). Theshortformofthequestionnairedoesnottouchupononeofthecentralis-
suesofrecentsocialanddemographicchange;genderequityanditssymmetryinside
and outside the home, clearly a powerful model of demographic change, especially
in relation to low fertility (McDonald 2000). The statistical correlation between re-
sponses to the Inglehart scale and actual demographic behaviour of interest is often
rather modest (see for example Figure 4).
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Figure 4While its proponents are careful to emphasise that this model is not in essence in
conflict with economic models of demographic change, it is often presented assuch
(by both sides). Economic and other models may well be more effective in account-
ing for trends. One example may be found in the former Communist countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, and in the European republics of the formerSoviet Un-
ion, where a plurality of explanations may be needed to account for recent trends.
Is the CEE region really post-materialist?
Cohabitation, divorce and births outside marriage had increased somewhat in
many of these populations during the 1980s, before the collapse of communism, as
part of a process of modernisation. A Second Demographic Transition explanation
may be persuasive in accounting for trends among the more prosperous sections of
thosepopulations (Sobotka etal.2003, LesthaegheandSurkyn2002). Howeveritis
difficult to see how that view can stand up in the face of the material realities after
1989 and 1991. Post-materialist sensibilities are supposed to be nurtured only by a
secure material situation. Are we expected to believe that they could still flourish in
the serious economic downturn, heightened unemployment and political insecurity
ofthepost-communistperiod,wherematerialstandardsoflivingfellbyupto40%in
a few years? Indeed, until the late 1990s anyway, “post-materialist” attitudes were
understandably much less developed in the CEE countries than in Western Europe
(Inglehart and Baker 2000). Yet in some former communist countries births outside
marriage and cohabitation increased very rapidly and marriage went into free fall in
themidstofthiseconomicturmoilandinsecurity.Thehighlydiscontinuousrapidin-
creaseofbirthsoutsidemarriageinBulgariaandRomania,afterovertwodecadesof
negligible change, are particularly noteworthy (Figure 5). These populations were
amongthepoorestoftheCEEcountriesundercommunism,arestillsubstantiallyru-
ralandhavesofarfailedtomakeeffectiveeconomicorpoliticaltransitions,remain-
ing in a weak economic position (Åslund 2001). Despite this unpromising theoreti-
calenvironmentforSDT,theirproportionsofbirthsoutsidemarriageexceedthosein
more prosperous, more westernised countries in Central Europe. Another
explanation is surely called for.
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CEE trends
This apparently “classical” SDT behaviour (e. g., high levels of births outside
marriage) can hardly be due to individual empowerment but needs a quite different
explanation. Instead, much of this early trend may be a social pathology, related to
“anomie”anddisorganisationespeciallyamongthepoorerelementsofapopulation
distressed and unsettled by recent changes (Philipov 2001). Okolski (pers comm.)
notesthatthehighestlevelsofbirthsoutsidemarriageinPolandarefoundinruralar-
easofWestPolandwheremostagriculturehadbeencollectivisedandwherethecol-
lectives had all become bankrupt in the early 1990s. However, the new difficulty of
obtaininglegalabortionsinPolandmayalsobeafactor.There,thepopulationswere
doubly detached from any conventional norms and restraints – once through the de-
struction of conventional village society (through collectivisation and transplanta-
tion from what is now Ukraine/ Belarus) and again when the collectives collapsed.
Most of these births are to unmarried, poorly educated and non-cohabiting teenag-
ers,notthetargetpopulationoftheenlightened,self-realising,secureconceptsofthe
SDT. A not dissimilar pattern can be found among teenagers in the lower strata of
Anglo-Saxon societies, where they are analysed under very different, and
unsympathetic, ideological umbrellas (Murray 1990, Fukuyama 1999).
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The SDT is a creative and valuable idea but may be mis-named. It is not a transi-
tion so much as a set of preferences, so far limited in time and space, of the more af-
fluentpopulationofsomeoftheNWEuropeanandEnglish-speakingcountriesover-
seas: a lifestyle choice perhaps only transiently sustained by welfare and high taxa-
tion. The age of entitlement may only temporarily have insulated people from the
consequences of their actions and thereby only transiently permitted a wider spec-
trumofbehaviour. Thesetrendscanprogressornot,withlittlebearingoncentralde-
mographic concerns, especially not on low fertility, which was claimed to be part of
the SDT “syndrome”. The identification of “leader countries” which others follow
hasproveddifficult;theredoesnotseemtobeonesingletrajectory.Sofarthis“tran-
sition” has created diversity and divergence rather than convergence on a new pat-
tern. It offers only one of several possible theoretical models for empirically similar
behaviour, and the empirical demographic trends themselves are not the exclusive
property of one theory.
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